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Abstract. Multisignature schemes are digital signature schemes that
permit one to determine a unique signature for a given message, de-
pending on the signatures of all the members of a speciﬁc group. In this
work, we present a new semi-short multisignature scheme based on the
Subgroup Discrete Logarithm Problem (SDLP) and on the Integer Fac-
torization Problem (IFP). The scheme can be carried out in an on- and
oﬀ-line basis, is eﬃcient, and the bitlength of the multisignature does
not depend on the number of signers.
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1 Introduction
There are currently diﬀerent methods and algorithms to perform, in a safe way,
digital signatures. Most of these protocols are based on Public Key Cryptography
[1]. The main feature of this kind of cryptography is that each individual has two
keys, one public key and one private key. Additionally, to make more eﬃcient the
procedures of digital signatures and their electronic transmission, hash functions
are used [2]. These functions are publicly known and allow signing a digest of
the original document instead of the whole document.
Multisignature schemes are protocols of digital signature whereby a group of
users, 퐺 = {푈1, . . . , 푈푡}, signs a document such that the signature is valid if and
only if all members of the group take part in the protocol and the signature ver-
iﬁes a speciﬁc condition of validity. These schemes have application in settings
such us, for example, corporate scenarios for signing contracts between compa-
nies, the government and public administrations, agreements between diﬀerent
organization, etc. The easiest way to carry out a multisignature for a message
is to consider as such signature the list formed by all the partial signatures of
each one of the signers. However, this signature is not practical since its length
is proportional to the number of signers [3, 4].
In general, most of the multisignature protocols are performed as follows:
1. The signer 푈1 signs the original message by using the signer private key.
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2. Each one of the following signers, in an ordered way, signs the document,
already signed by the one who is previous in the group.
3. The last member of 퐺, 푈푡, signs the signed document that the previous
signer has sent to him and sends to the veriﬁer the original message and the
multisignature calculated by the group of signers.
The veriﬁer performs the veriﬁcation of the multisignature by checking each
one of the partial signatures of the group of signers, following the protocol and
keeping the order in which they were signed.
The ﬁrst multisignature scheme was proposed in [5], where a modiﬁcation of
the RSA cryptosystem was performed in such a way that the module considered
was the product of three primes instead of just two. In [6] a scheme was pro-
posed where the signature length is similar to the length of a simple signature
and shorter than the signature obtained from the scheme proposed in [5]. This
proposal can be used only if the cryptosystem is bijective. Other proposals based
on the RSA cryptosystems have been proposed [7–11].
Regarding multisignature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem,
in [12] the group of signers must cooperate to sign the message and send the
signature to a given group of veriﬁers. Only the union of all veriﬁers is able to
validate the multisignature. Additionally, the signers must use not only their own
private keys, but also the public key of all the veriﬁers. However, this scheme
has some weaknesses [13, 14]. The scheme proposed in [15] allows to perform a
multisignature if the veriﬁers of the signature belong to a previously speciﬁed
group.This scheme has some weaknesses as well [16, 17].
In [18] a multisignature scheme for a generic model of public key is presented.
The model requires some properties: Each one of the signers must have a certiﬁed
public key with its corresponding private key, which must be generated by the
signer himself. The signers must interact in a given number of rounds. In each
round each signer receives a message, performs several calculations and sends
another message to the next signer. It must be computationally infeasible to
forge a multisignature if there exists one honest signer.
Our multisignature scheme has the property and advantage that each signer
has his own private key, but all of them share the same public key. In this sense,
the new scheme does not match exactly the model proposed in [18] since the
procedure is carried out in just one round in which all the signers participate.
Moreover, each signer does not need to have his own certiﬁed pair of keys (public
and private). In fact, in the protocol all the signers share the same public key,
but each one has his own private key. This fact simpliﬁes and spares some of the
problems related to the computational eﬀort for computation, bandwidth, and,
therefore, the overall eﬃciency of the proposed protocol.
Our proposal veriﬁes several properties: It is secure, eﬃcient, independent
of the number of signers, the signature is determined by all the signers in any
previously given order, allows adding new signers, and the veriﬁcation procedure
does require the veriﬁcation of the partial signature of each member of 퐺.
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We propose a new multisignature scheme whereby each member of a given group,
퐺, signs a document making use of his private key. The veriﬁer of the signature
checks whether the signature corresponds to the multisignature of the group, by
using the public key that all the members of the group share [19].
We suppose that 퐺 = {푈1, 푈2, . . . , 푈푡} is the group of signer and 풯 is the
Trusted Third Party which computes its own private key, the unique public key
associated to all private keys, as well as helps the members of 퐺 to generate
their private key.
2.1 Key generation
First of all, 풯 generates its own private key:
1. 풯 chooses two large primes 푝 and 푞 such that
푝 = 푢1 ⋅ 푟 ⋅ 푝1 + 1, 푞 = 푢2 ⋅ 푟 ⋅ 푞1 + 1,
with 푟, 푝1, 푞1 primes, 푢1, 푢2 ∈ ℤ, with gcd(푢1, 푢2) = 2, i.e., 푢1 = 2푣1,
푣2 = 2푣2, and gcd(푣1, 푣2) = 1. To guarantee the security of the scheme,
the bitlength of 푟 is chosen so that the Discrete Logarithm Problem in a
Subgroup of ℤ∗푛, of order 푟, be computationally infeasible. Although the fac-
tors of 푛 are of a particular form, they can be eﬃciently generated and to our
knowledge there is no known eﬃcient algorithm to factorize 푛 ([20], [21]).
2. 풯 computes
푛 = 푝 ⋅ 푞,
휙(푛) = (푝− 1)(푞 − 1) = 푢1 ⋅ 푢2 ⋅ 푟2 ⋅ 푝1 ⋅ 푞1,
휆(푛) = lcm(푝− 1, 푞 − 1) = 휙(푛)
gcd(푝− 1, 푞 − 1) = 2푣1 ⋅ 푣2 ⋅ 푟 ⋅ 푝1 ⋅ 푞1,
where 휙(푛) is the Euler function and 휆(푛) is the Carmichael function.
3. Next, 풯 selects an element 훼 ∈ ℤ∗푛 of order 푟 modulo 푛, verifying
gcd(훼, 휙(푛)) = gcd(훼, 푢1 ⋅ 푢2 ⋅ 푟2 ⋅ 푝1 ⋅ 푞1) = 1.
The element 훼 can be eﬃciently computed due to the fact that 풯 knows
the factorization of 푛, 휙(푛), and 휆(푛) [21, Lemma 3.1]. We denote by 푆푟 the
multiplicative subgroup of ℤ∗푛 generated by 훼.
4. 풯 generates a secret random number 푠 ∈ ℤ∗푟 and computes
훽 ≡ 훼푠 (mod 푛). (1)
5. The values (훼, 푟, 훽, 푛) are made public; whereas 풯 keeps secret (푝, 푞, 푠).
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Remark that breaking the key generation protocol amounts to solving the
Integer factorization Problem (IFP). Moreover, to determine 푠 from 훽 in the ex-
pression (1) the Subgroup Discrete Logarithm Problem (SDLP) must be solved.
Before generating the private key of each signer, 풯 generates its private key
and the shared public key as follows:
1. 풯 determines its private key by generating four random integer numbers
푎0, 푏0, 푐0, 푑0 ∈ ℤ∗푟 .
2. 풯 obtains the common public key by computing
푃 ≡ 훼푎0 ⋅ 훽푏0 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푎0+푠⋅푏0 ≡ 훼ℎ,
푄 ≡ 훼푐0 ⋅ 훽푑0 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푐0+푠⋅푑0 ≡ 훼푘.
where ℎ ≡ (푎0 + 푠 ⋅ 푏0) (mod 푟) and 푘 ≡ (푐0 + 푠 ⋅ 푑0) (mod 푟).
For avoiding 풯 can impersonate any signer of 퐺, an interactive session be-
tween each user 푈푖 and 풯 is developed to compute 푈푖’s private key, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푡:
1. 푈푖 generates two secret integers 푏푖, 푑푖 ∈ ℤ푟 at random and sends the values
of 훼푏푖 , 훼푑푖 to 풯 in a secure way, in order to protect both secret integers.
Note that 풯 can determine 퐴푖 and 퐶푖 since it knows ℎ, 푘, 훼푏푖 , and 훼푑푖 , but
it cannot compute 푎푖, 푐푖 because it cannot solve the SDLP. In short, each
party gets access to only 2 out of the 4 key parameters.
2. 풯 computes
퐴푖 ≡ 훼ℎ ⋅ (훼푏푖)−푠 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푎푖 ,
퐶푖 ≡ 훼푘 ⋅ (훼푑푖)−푠 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푐푖 .
Then 풯 sends to 푈푖 the values of 퐴푖, 퐶푖 by using a secure channel.
3. The private key of 푈푖 is the set (푏푖, 푑푖, 퐴푖, 퐶푖). Remark that for 푈푖 it is also
impossible to compute the values of 푎푖 and 푐푖.
2.2 Key veriﬁcation
To verify the correctness of 풯 ’s key, each signer, 푈푖 ∈ 퐺, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푡, tests if
훼 ∕≡ 1 (mod 푛), 훼푟 ≡ 1 (mod 푛).
Moreover, each signer must verify that his private key corresponds to the public
key (푃,푄) by checking the correctness of the following expressions:
푃 ≡ 퐴푖 ⋅ 훽푏푖 (mod 푛), 푄 ≡ 퐶푖 ⋅ 훽푑푖 (mod 푛).
In fact, we have:
퐴푖 ⋅ 훽푏푖 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푎푖 ⋅ 훽푏푖 ≡ 훼푎푖+푠⋅푏푖 ≡ 훼ℎ ≡ 푃,
퐶푖 ⋅ 훽푑푖 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푐푖 ⋅ 훽푑푖 ≡ 훼푐푖+푠⋅푑푖 ≡ 훼푘 ≡ 푄.
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2.3 Signing a message
We will present a protocol to determine a multisignature of the group 퐺 for a
given message 푀 , where only the signers participate.
We suppose a secure hash function, 픥, has been selected (for example, one
of the SHA-2 family) with 픥(푀) = 푚. Moreover, it is assumed that the set of
signers has been ordered, due to the fact that each signer will sign the signature
determined by the previous signer.
The process is as follows: Each signer veriﬁes the partial signature deter-
mined by the previous signer, computes his own signature by using the received
signature, and sends the new partial signature to the next signer.
1. The ﬁrst signer, 푈1, computes his partial signature for the message 푀 by
using his private key, (푏1, 푑1, 퐴1, 퐶1), and 푚 = 픥(푀):
퐹1 ≡ 퐴1 ⋅ 퐶푚1 (mod 푛),
푔1 ≡ 푏1 +푚 ⋅ 푑1 (mod 푟)
and sends (퐹1, 푔1) to the second signer, 푈2.
2. The second signer, 푈2, veriﬁes 푈1’s signature checking if
푃 ⋅푄푚 ≡ 퐹1 ⋅ 훽푔1 (mod 푛).
푈2 computes his partial signature for the message:
퐹2 ≡ 퐹1 ⋅퐴2 ⋅ 퐶푚2 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푎1+푎2+푚(푐1+푐2),
푔2 ≡ 푔1 + 푏2 +푚 ⋅ 푑2 (mod 푟) ≡ 푏1 + 푏2 +푚(푑1 + 푑2).
푈2 sends (퐹2, 푔2) as his partial signature to the third signer.
. . .
i. The signer 푈푖 receives the 푈푖−1’s partial signature (퐹푖−1, 푔푖−1) and then
veriﬁes this partial signature checking if
푃 푖−1 ⋅푄(푖−1)⋅푚 ≡ 퐹푖−1 ⋅ 훽푔푖−1 (mod 푛).
푈푖 computes his partial signature:
퐹푖 ≡ 퐹푖−1 ⋅퐴푖 ⋅ 퐶푚푖 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푎1+⋅⋅⋅+푎푖+푚(푐1+⋅⋅⋅+푐푖),
푔푖 ≡ 푔푖−1 + 푏푖 +푚 ⋅ 푑푖 (mod 푟) ≡ 푏1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푏푖 +푚(푑1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푑푖).
푈푖 sends (퐹푖, 푔푖) to the next signer.
. . .
t. The last signer in the group, 푈푡, receives the 푈푡−1’s partial signature and
veriﬁes that signature testing if
푃 푡−1 ⋅푄(푡−1)⋅푚 ≡ 퐹푡−1 ⋅ 훽푔푡−1 (mod 푛).
푈푡 computes his partial signature for the message:
퐹푡 ≡ 퐹푡−1 ⋅퐴푡 ⋅ 퐶푚푡 (mod 푛) ≡ 훼푎1+⋅⋅⋅+푎푡+푚(푐1+⋅⋅⋅+푐푡),
푔푡 ≡ 푔푡−1 + 푏푡 + 푑푡 ⋅푚 (mod 푟) ≡ 푏1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푏푡 +푚(푑1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푑푡).
푈푡 makes public the multisignature for 푀 : (퐹, 푔) = (퐹푡, 푔푡).
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The veriﬁcation of each partial signature carried out by each signer (but the
ﬁrst one) is necessary in order to avoid that a signer signs a non-valid message.
Moreover, the veriﬁcation of the 푈푖’s partial signature is correct because it is





훼푎푗 ⋅ 훽푏푗 (훼푐푗 ⋅ 훽푑푗)푚 ≡ 푖∏
푗=1
푃 ⋅푄푚 = 푃 푖 ⋅푄푖⋅푚.
2.4 Verifying the multisignature
Let (퐹, 푔) be the multisignature for a message 푀 computed by the group of 푡
signers, 퐺. In order to verify such signature, a veriﬁer must to check if
푃 푡 ⋅푄푡⋅푚 ≡ 퐹 ⋅ 훽푔 (mod 푛). (2)
This veriﬁcation equation is correct as




훼푎푗 ⋅ 훽푏푗 (훼푐푗 ⋅ 훽푑푗)푚 ≡ 푡∏
푗=1
푃 ⋅푄푚 = 푃 푡 ⋅푄푡⋅푚.
2.5 Properties and Security analysis
The proposed multisignature scheme has the following properties:
1. The scheme has a ﬁxed size, i.e., it does not depend on the number of signers.
2. The multisignature is a semi-short signature in the sense that the pair (퐹, 푔)
is composed by two elements belonging to ℤ∗푛 and to ℤ∗푟 , respectively.
3. The multisignature is eﬃcient as all computations require polynomial time.
4. It is possible to include new signers in the group 퐺 without re-execution
of the protocol by the rest of the signers. It is possible to place the new
signers at the end of the signer group so that each one of them follows the
protocol by computing his partial signature from the previously computed
multisignature.
5. The multisignature veriﬁcation process is easy and eﬃcient.
The proposed multisignature scheme is secure since to break the proposed
scheme an attacker needs to solve three diﬃcult problems: IFP, DLP, and SDLP.
Hence, a signer knowing only his private key cannot determine neither 풯 ’s private
key nor its secret value 푠.
In the scheme it is impossible for two signers to compute a forged signature
because each signer veriﬁes the signatures of all the previous signers.
Moreover, two or more signers could try to conspire with the goal of obtaining
the secret value 푠 of 풯 , and then computing new private keys.
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In this attack, if the signers 푈푖 and 푈푗 , 푗 > 푖, share their signatures (퐹푖, 푔푖)
and (퐹푗 , 푔푗), they know that the following holds
퐹푖 ⋅ 훽푔푖 ≡ 퐹푗 ⋅ 훽푔푗 (mod 푛),
퐴푖 ⋅ 훽푏푖 ⋅ 퐶푚푖 ⋅ 훽푚푑푖 ≡ 퐴푗 ⋅ 훽푏푗 ⋅ 퐶푚푗 ⋅ 훽푚푑푗 (mod 푛),
훼푎푖+푠⋅푏푖+푚⋅푐푖+푠⋅푚⋅푑푖 ≡ 훼푎푗+푠⋅푏푗+푚⋅푐푗+푠⋅푚⋅푑푗 (mod 푛).
Then, they can suppose that the exponents verify the following equations:
푎푖 + 푠 ⋅ 푏푖 +푚 ⋅ 푐푖 + 푠 ⋅푚 ⋅ 푑푖 ≡ 푎푗 + 푠 ⋅ 푏푗 +푚 ⋅ 푐푗 + 푠 ⋅푚 ⋅ 푑푗 (mod 푟),
푎푖 − 푎푗 +푚(푐푖 − 푐푗) ≡ 푠((푏푗 − 푏푖) +푚(푑푗 − 푑푖)) (mod 푟),
푠 ≡ (푎푖 − 푎푗 +푚(푐푖 − 푐푗))((푏푗 − 푏푖) +푚(푑푗 − 푑푖))−1 (mod 푟).
But, none of them can solve this equation because they do not know 푎푖, 푎푗 , 푐푖, 푐푗 .
The scheme is secure even if a user has access to the signatures of two distinct
messages signed with the same keys because it implies solving IFP and DLP.
Finally, nobody can determine a forged multisignature for the message 푀
without being detected by 풯 . In fact, a forger could know the public key, (푃,푄),
the message, 푀 , its hash, 푚, the number of signers, 푡, and the values (훼, 푟, 훽, 푛).
From these data, he can choose an integer 푔¯ and determine the element 훽푔¯ =
훼푠⋅푔¯ ∈ 푆푟. Moreover, he can compute
퐹 ≡ 푃 푡 ⋅푄푡⋅푚 ⋅ (훽푔¯)−1 (mod 푛)
and publish the pair (퐹 , 푔¯) as a multisignature of the signer group 퐺 for the
message 푀 , that passes the veriﬁcation equation (2).





퐴푖 ⋅ 퐶푚푖 (mod 푛),
and shows that 퐹˜−1 ⋅ 퐹 ∕≡ 1 (mod 푛).
3 Conclusions
A new semi-short multisignature scheme based on three diﬃcult problems from
Number Theory, namely, integer factorization, discrete logarithms, and subgroup
discrete logarithms has been proposed. A multisignature (퐹, 푔) is semi-short in
the sense that 퐹 ∈ ℤ∗푛 and 푔 ∈ ℤ∗푟 , where the bitlength of 푛 is much bigger than
the the bitlength of 푟.
This scheme permits one to obtain a semi-short signature with a ﬁxed bitlength,
which is independent of the number of signers.
The multisignature scheme is eﬃcient since the computations only require
polynomial time, veriﬁes the conditions of multisignature schemes, and moreover
it is secure both against conspiracy attacks and against forgery.
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